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Braswell v. United States: The Collective
Entity Doctrine and the Compelled
Testimony Standard
Introduction
For over one hundred years the United States Supreme Court has
wrestled with the question whether an individual representing a collec-
tive entity' may resist a subpoena demanding the production of the en-
tity's documents on the ground that he might incriminate himself.2
Answering the question has been difficult because of the need to balance
individual interests such as privacy3 and freedom from self-incrimina-
tion4 against the Government's interest in effective law enforcement.' To
balance these interests, the Court developed the collective entity doc-
trine, which withholds the self-incrimination privilege from collective en-
tities and their representatives.6
In 1976 the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States7 introduced a
new approach to self-incrimination analysis by applying a compelled tes-
timony standard.' In its application of this standard, the Court recog-
nized an individual's right to resist a subpoena for sole proprietorship
business documents if the act of producing them represented compelled
1. A "collective entity" is "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity
apart from its individual members." Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974). While
there is no definitive standard of what constitutes a collective entity, case law has included
corporations, labor unions, and partnerships within the collective entity definition. See infra
notes 36 & 40-41 and accompanying text.
2. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that the Government
could not compel members of a partnership to produce receipts to be used as evidence against
the partners in a proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud in violation of federal revenue
laws.
3. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (privilege "respects a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-con-
demnation"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privilege reflects respect
for right of an individual to lead a private life).
4. See infra notes 21-22.
5. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944) (effective law enforcement is impossi-
ble if the privilege is granted to corporate representatives); Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 (recognizing
an organizational representative's privilege would frustrate legitimate governmental
regulation).
6. See infra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
7. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
8. Id. at 410. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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testimonial communication which could incriminate that individual.9
The introduction of the Fisher compelled testimony standard raised
a question whether this new standard supplemented or replaced the older
collective entity doctrine. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the
compelled testimony standard for sole proprietors ° but had no opportu-
nity to decide if the standard applied to representatives of collective enti-
ties."1 A majority of the circuit courts concluded the new standard did
not. 12
In 1988 the Supreme Court decided Braswell v. United States, 3 a
case in which a corporate president asserted that the act of producing
subpoenaed corporate records would violate his privilege against self-in-
crimination. 4 Braswell, the corporate president, based his claim upon
the compelled testimony standard, thus placing the collective entity doc-
trine and the Fisher standard in conflict.
The Braswell Court held that the compelled testimony standard
does not extend to collective entities. 5 In reaching this decision, the
Court applied an innovative twist to the traditional agency rationale un-
derlying the collective entity doctrine. 6 Although the decision appears
to foreclose availability of the compelled testimony standard to custodi-
ans of collective entity records, careful analysis suggests the issue is not
entirely settled. 7
Part I of this Comment reviews the fifth amendment privilege as it
pertains to representatives of business entities. This review sets the back-
ground for Part II, which discusses the majority and dissenting opinions
in Braswell. Part III analyzes the Court's decision and discusses the fun-
damental tension between protecting the individual privilege and prose-
cuting white-collar crime.
This analysis demonstrates that the Braswell Court attempted to re-
solve the conflict between the collective entity doctrine and the com-
pelled testimony standard by drawing a bright-line distinction between
9. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
10. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). Although the Court affirmed the standard,
it did not clarify its application. Rather than applying the compelled testimony standard to
the facts of the case, the Court merely upheld a lower court finding that a sole proprietor could
withhold subpoenaed business documents because the act of producing those documents in-
volved testimonial self-incrimination. Id. at 613-14.
11. Id. at 606. Doe did not provide the Court with an opportunity to address the collec-
tive entity doctrine issue because the defendant in Doe was a sole proprietor.
12. Comment, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Collective Entities, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
295, 308, 315 (1987) [hereinafter Collective Entities] (Only the Third Circuit, and in limited
cases, the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have departed from the majority rule).
13. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
14. Id. at 2286.
15. Id. at 2291.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 137-142.
17. See infra notes 143 & 192-201 and accompanying text.
collective entities and sole proprietorships. The Court actually pro-
longed the conflict, however, by introducing a new basis for the tradi-
tional agency rationale underlying the collective entity doctrine. This
Comment concludes that although the Braswell decision held little prac-
tical significance for petitioner Braswell, the Court's reasoning leaves un-
settled the ability of some collective entity custodians to successfully
assert their privilege against self-incrimination.
I. Background
A. Conflict Between the Privilege and Effective Law Enforcement
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ."I At
various times the Supreme Court has construed this provision to protect
individual property19 and privacy interests 20 as well as a natural person's
"privilege" 21 to resist governmental compulsion of incriminating testi-
mony.22 The privilege is not absolute. It may not be asserted to resist
disclosure of evidence which is not compelled,23 not incriminating, 24 or
not testimonial.25 The privilege may not be claimed by one individual to
withhold testimony that threatens incrimination of another.26
Furthermore, the privilege may be claimed only by a natural person
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("[I]t is the invasion of his indefeasi-
ble right of... private property" that "constitutes the essence of [the offense].").
20. See cases cited supra note 3.
21. The term "privilege" appears throughout this Comment. It is commonly used in
commentaries and cases to refer to the protection against self-incrimination afforded by the
Fifth Amendment. Some commentators prefer the term "right" because it more correctly
implies the protection may not be withdrawn by the Government. See Comment, The Right
Against Self-Incrimination by Producing Documents: Rethinking the Representative Capacity
Doctrine, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1605 n.2 (1986).
22. See Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2345-46 (1988) (" '[T]he privilege protects a
person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.' ")
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)); Braswell v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]wo of the critical foundations for the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination [are] first, that it is an explicit right of a natural person,
protecting the realm of human thought and expression[, and] second, that it is confined to
governmental compulsion.").
23. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) ("It is extortion of information from
the accused himself that offends our sense of justice.").
24. Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1544, 1552 n.69 (1986) (The privilege does not apply unless the testimonial admissions
might incriminate the person in future criminal proceedings. The privilege does not protect
against other harms such as embarrassment, scorn, and civil liability.).
25. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408. See Note, supra note 24, at 1549-50 (Examples of nontestimo-
nial acts include giving blood, creating voice exemplars, creating handwriting exemplars, fur-
nishing fingerprints, participating in a lineup, trying on clothes, or displaying wounds.).
26. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
BR,4SWELL v UNITED STATES
Summer 1989]
Summer 1989]
556 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 16:553
and is not available to a collective entity, 27 nor may a natural person
raise his personal privilege to protect a collective entity.28 The privilege
has been withheld from collective entities because of the government's
concern for effective business regulation and prosecution of white-collar
crime.29
A conflict occurs between the personal privilege and the law en-
forcement interest whenever an individual, because of his position within
a collective entity, is compelled to furnish business records that are re-
quired for effective law enforcement, but which also incriminate that in-
dividual. To resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court developed the
collective entity doctrine. This doctrine holds that no individual agent or
employee of a collective entity may invoke his personal self-incrimination
privilege on behalf of the entity.3 ° He also may not invoke the privilege
on his own behalf to withhold production of entity documents even when
the contents of those documents may be personally incriminating. 3' The
Court has relied on several rationales during the course of developing its
collective entity doctrine. 32
B. Collective Entity Doctrine
The collective entity doctrine originated in Hale v. Henkel,33 and
was based upon two rationales. First, the fifth amendment privilege is
purely personal; an individual cannot assert his personal privilege on be-
half of another, 34 and therefore an individual cannot claim his own privi-
lege to protect a corporation.35 Second, a corporation is an entity created
by the state for the public good, and the state holds a visitatorial power
to investigate corporations to ensure they are not exceeding their
authority.36
The Supreme Court expanded the doctrine during the next eighty
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 70.
29. See supra note 5, and infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
30. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974).
31. Id.
32. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1, 50 (1987). The Court at various times has utilized five rationales in support of the
collective entity doctrine: (1) custodian's lack of property rights in entity documents, (2) state's
visitatorial power to monitor state-created entities, (3) custodian's lack of personal privacy
interests in entity documents, (4) custodian's waiver of his personal privilege, and (5) govern-
ment's concern for effective law enforcement.
33. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (A corporate officer protected by immunity attempted to invoke
his personal privilege on behalf of the corporation to resist production of corporate
documents.).
34. Id. at 69-70.
35. Id. at 70.
36. Id. at 74-75 (A corporation is a state-created entity which possesses only those rights
granted by the state. The state holds a power of visitation over state-created entities to ensure
that they are not exceeding their authority or doing anything contrary to the public good.).
years.37 In 1911, employing an agency theory, the Court held that a cus-
todian waives his personal privilege to refuse production of incriminating
documents when he voluntarily assumes his custodial position.38 The
Court subsequently held that when a custodian assumes the duties of his
office, he also assumes "the obligation to produce the books of which he
is custodian in response to a rightful exercise of the State's visitatorial
powers." 9 Later, the Court abandoned its reliance upon the state visita-
torial power rationale when it extended the doctrine to representatives of
other organizations such as labor unions' and partnerships. 1 It relied
instead upon a more general governmental need to regulate the affairs of
economically powerful organizations. 2 The Court also recognized a pri-
vacy rationale; because a custodian holds no privacy interests in entity
documents, he may not claim any personal privilege to protect their
contents.43
In Curcio v. United States' the Court carved a narrow exception for
oral testimony from the collective entity doctrine. The Court drew a
distinction between compelled oral testimony and compelled production
of corporate books when it overturned an order holding a labor union
37. For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine's development, see Mosteller, supra
note 32, at 51-59; Collective Entities, supra note 12, at 298-305; Comment, Organizational Pa-
pers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 642-44 (1986) [here-
inafter Organizational Papers]; Note, Pleading the Fifth: Record Custodians and the Act-of-
Production Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 633, 635-38 (1987).
38. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 386 (1911) (A corporate officer may not refuse
to produce corporate records, even if those records might incriminate him, because he is bound
by a duty to the corporation to produce those records.). See also Mosteller, supra note 32, at
53-54 (A custodian waived his personal privilege when he assumed his position.).
39. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124 (1957).
40. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). The Court recognized that the
state's visitatorial power rationale was unavailable to justify withholding the privilege because
the labor union was not a state-created entity. Id. at,700-01.
41. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 97 n.7 (1974) (A partnership has "enough of the
indicia" found in other collective entities to justify similar treatment as to self-incrimination
analysis.). Although the Bellis Court did not articulate any criteria that it considered signifi-
cant in determining whether an organization qualifies as a separate entity, it did mention that
the test for self-incrimination purposes cannot be reduced to a simple question of size, id. at
100, or "turn on an insubstantial difference in the form of the business enterprise," id. at 101.
In addition, the Court expressly stated that the privilege is unavailable to a custodian of corpo-
rate records regardless how small the corporation. Id. at 100.
42. White, 322 U.S. at 700.
43. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 (Collective entity records are not subject to an individual's per-
sonal privilege because the records are not private.).
44. 354 U.S. 118 (1957). As officer of a labor union, Curcio was served two subpoenas,
one demanding production of union documents and the other requiring him to testify. Id. at
119. Curcio failed to produce the documents, claimed they were not in his possession, and
refused to testify as to the documents' location. Id. The trial court held Curcio in contempt.
Id. at 121. The Supreme Court reversed the contempt order, holding that the Government
may not compel self-incriminating oral testimony from a collective entity representative. Id. at
128.
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officer in contempt for refusing to testify concerning the location of sub-
poenaed union records that he failed to produce." Significantly, the
Curcio Court realized that acts of production may carry their own testi-
monial significance.4 6 Nevertheless, these acts of production may be
compelled47 whereas oral testimony cannot.48
C. Compelled Testimony Standard
In 1976 the Supreme Court abruptly changed the course of its fifth
amendment self-incrimination jurisprudence. In Fisher v. United States49
the Court expressly rejected the privacy rationale.5 In doing so, it intro-
duced an entirely new rationale.5 The Fisher Court held that a sole pro-
prietor will be permitted to assert his personal privilege if the act of
producing the documents might be incriminating.52 The act of produc-
tion is presumed self-incriminating if the individual claiming the privi-
lege can show that the act (1) is compelled, (2) is a testimonial
communication, and (3) is incriminating.5 3
The Court recognized that when records have been subpoenaed,
compulsion is clearly present. 4 "[T]he more difficult issues are whether
45. Id. at 124-25, 128.
46. Id. at 125. ("The custodian's act of producing books or records in response to 0 sub-
poena.., is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the
subpoena.").
47. Id. at 127 n.7.
48. Id. at 128. The Court's basis for this distinction was that
[t]he compulsory production of corporate or association records by their custodian is
readily justifiable, even though the custodian protests against it for personal reasons,
because he does not own the records and has no legally cognizable interest in them.
However, forcing the custodian to testify orally as to the whereabouts of nonpro-
duced records requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind. . . .That is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
49. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Justice Marshall recognized the novelty of the compelled testi-
mony standard. "Today the Court adopts a wholly new approach for deciding when the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted to bar production of documen-
tary evidence." Id. at 430 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 401. Justice White did not find any safeguards for privacy within the Fifth
Amendment.
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its
language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned
in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to
the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination,
not [the disclosure of] private information."
Id. (quoting United States v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
51. Mosteller, supra note 32, at 58 ("Much of what had come before became obsolete with
the decision in [Fisher], where the Court ... set out a new system for evaluating documentary
subpoenas ....").
52. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
53. Id. at 408. This test was developed from a strict construction of the language in the
Self-Incrimination Clause. See supra note 50.
54. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
BRASWELL v. UNITED STATES
the tacit averments of the [witness] are both 'testimonial' and 'incrimi-
nating'. . . ."" After recognizing that these are questions of fact which
must be resolved in each individual case, the Court identified three ways
in which an act of production might have testimonial significance: Pro-
duction might (1) concede the existence of the documents, (2) concede
possession or control of the documents, or (3) indicate the belief that the
documents produced, are those demanded by the subpoena. 6
By contrast, the contents of voluntarily created documents are not
subject to the privilege.5 7 In a subsequent case, United States v. Doe,5"
the Court explained that because such records are prepared voluntarily,
the facts disclosed by their contents entail no compulsion. 9 Indeed, the
Doe Court held that business records prepared without compulsion can
be subpoenaed and the contents used to incriminate even the person com-
pelled to produce them.60
Prior to Fisher, collective entity decisions had frequently distin-
guished protected personal documents from unprotected entity docu-
ments on a privacy rationale.61 Private documents were subject to the
privilege, but nonprivate documents were not.62 By abandoning the pri-
vacy rationale, the Fisher Court eliminated this basis for distinction and
opened the door to the possibility that the compelled testimony standard
applied to entity representatives as well as to individuals.63 The circuit
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 409-10 ("[T]he preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases was wholly
voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence ... .
58. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
59. Id. at 612 n.10 ("If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily
compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged.").
60. Id. at 611-12.
61. Organizational Papers, supra note 37, at 640-41 (The distinction between personal and
organizational records has been based on privacy rights and regulatory efficacy. Under the
compelled testimony standard, privacy is immaterial and regulatory concerns are mitigated.);
Note, supra note 24, at 1562 ("In light of the Court's recent shift to compelled testimonial
incrimination as the guide for determining the scope of fifth amendment protection, however,
the principles behind the entity doctrine no longer justify withholding fifth amendment protec-
tion for testimony implicit in the act of producing corporate documents." (footnote omitted)).
62. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1957) (" '[Tihe papers and effects
which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege,
or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity' ") (quoting United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944)).
63. Some commentators have argued that the Fisher Court eliminated the privacy ration-
ale underlying the self-incrimination privilege for individuals and collective entities. See, e.g.,
Organizational Papers, supra note 37, at 647-48 (Privacy is immaterial under the compelled
testimony standard. Therefore, the privacy rationale that distinguishes personal from organi-
zational documents is no longer valid.).
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courts split on the issue.64 A majority of the circuits decided that the
Fisher-Doe analysis applied only to sole proprietorships, and that the col-
lective entity doctrine still applied to other organizations such as
corporations.65
To resolve this issue, the Supreme Court required a controversy in
which a collective entity representative claimed his personal privilege to
resist governmentally compelled production of entity documents because
the act threatened self-incrimination. That opportunity arrived in the




Randy Braswell began business as a sole proprietor in 1965, and
conducted all private financial affairs through his business. 67 Braswell
formed two Mississippi corporations, Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc.
in 1980, and Worldwide Purchasing, Inc. in 1981.68 He was sole owner
and president of each corporation, holding all of the stock in Worldwide
Machinery, which in turn held all of the stock in Worldwide
Purchasing.6 9
Braswell chose to incorporate solely to enhance his business im-
64. See supra note 12 and accompanying text, and cases cited infra note 65. The courts
relied upon two basic theories:
(1) The modem collective entity doctrine focuses on document contents and privacy.
The act of production doctrine does not rely upon either. Therefore, the collective entity doc-
trine is not pertinent to any compelled testimony standard inquiry. See Organizational Papers,
supra note 37, at 647.
(2) The compelled testimony standard applies only to sole proprietorships. Therefore,
the collective entity standard is controlling in cases involving corporations and other entities.
See Collective Entities, supra note 12, at 308.
65. See Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2287 n.2 (1988) (citing the following
cases which refused to recognize a fifth amendment privilege: In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-
5), 784 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 918 (1987); United States v. Malis, 737
F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1984), In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir.
1984)); (and citing the following cases which recognized a fifth amendment privilege: United
States v. Antonio J. Sancetta, M.D., P.C., 788 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Matter
(Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986); In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816
F.2d 569 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
66. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
67. Brief for Petitioner Randy Braswell at 3, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284
(1988) (No. 87-3) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. Before and after incorporation, Braswell
did not have a personal checking account. Id. at 5. All of his personal finances were con-
ducted through the company. Id.
68. Id. at 3-4.
69. Id. at 4.
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age.70 After incorporation, Braswell continued to commingle his per-
sonal and business assets. 71 Braswell held total and absolute authority
over the business. 72 In short, Randy Braswell conducted his corporate
affairs like a sole proprietor. 3
In 1986 the Internal Revenue Service served Braswell with a sub-
poena to testify before a federal grand jury.7 4 In the alternative, the sub-
poena commanded Braswell to deliver to the serving agent all corporate
records for specified years. 75 Braswell filed a "Motion To Quash Sub-
poena for Production of Documents," asserting a fifth amendment privi-
lege to withhold the documents because the act of producing the
documents would have a self-incriminating testimonial effect.76
The issue before the district court was whether the Fisher compelled
testimony standard,77 previously applied only to sole proprietors, should
be extended to Braswell.78 The court found that earlier Fifth Circuit
decisions had denied a fifth amendment privilege to corporate records
custodians.79 The principle authority for those decisions was language in
70. Id. The attorney who performed the legal work creating the corporations testified
that Braswell did not incorporate for any of the traditional reasons, such as tax planning, profit
sharing plans, or limited personal liability for corporate debts. Id. at 4-5.
71. Id. at 5-6. All of Braswell's personal assets, including his house, were held in the
name of Worldwide Purchasing, Inc. Id. at 5. Braswell had no personal checking account, but
used the corporate account for personal expenditures. Id. Credit cards he and his wife used
for personal purchases were issued in the name of the corporation. Id. at 6.
72. Id. In compliance with Mississippi law, the board of directors consisted of three indi-
viduals: Braswell as president, his wife as secretary-treasurer, and his mother as vice-president.
Id. at 5. The only employee, a secretary, was Braswell's sister-in-law. Id. Only Braswell was
authorized, however, to act on behalf of the business. Id. at 5-6.
Although the Court never expressly mentioned it, the existence of the sole employee may
have been significant. See infra text accompanying note 196.
73. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 4-5. The district judge concluded that "under
the facts, Mr. Braswell was obviously doing business through the corporate name but was
managing the affairs of the corporation as close to the manner in which a sole proprietorship
would be handled as almost could be conceived." Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 1-2.
75. Id. at 2. The subpoena stated, "In the alternative, you are commanded to deliver the
subpoenaed documents to the agent serving this subpoena, in which event you need not appear
or bring the subpoenaed documents at the location, date and time specified above." Id. The
documents requested included
receipts and disbursements journals; general ledger and subsidiaries; accounts re-
ceivable/accounts payable ledgers, cards, and all customer data; bank records of
savings and checking accounts, including statements, checks, and deposit tickets;
contracts, invoices-sales and purchase, conveyances, and correspondence; minutes
and stock books or ledgers; loan disclosure statements and agreements; liability
ledgers; and retained copies of Forms 1120, W-2, W-4, 1099, 940 and 941.
Id. at 41 n.15.
76. Id. at 2-3. Portions of the procedural history not germane to the discussion here are
omitted.
77. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 6.
79. Id.
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Bellis v. United States81 which stated that the privilege is withheld from
corporate representatives, regardless of corporate size.81 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit found Bellis controlling and upheld the lower court.82
The issue presented in Braswell had engendered conflict among the
circuit courts. A few of the circuits had found the Fisher-Doe standard
applicable to corporate custodians in at least some situations.83 To re-
solve the conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.84 The question
certified for review was "whether the custodian of corporate records may
resist a subpoena for such records on the ground that the act of produc-
tion would incriminate him in violation of the Fifth Amendment."85
B. Majority Opinion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit.86
The Court held that a representative of a corporation, even a corporation
operated like a sole proprietorship, does not have a fifth amendment self-
incrimination privilege to resist compelled production of voluntarily pre-
pared corporate records.87 No privilege exists even if the subpoena is
addressed to the representative personally or if the act of production
might prove personally incriminating.88
The Court recognized two distinct lines of authority: one line in-
80. Id. In Bellis, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), a partner in a then dissolved three-person law firm
was directed by subpoena to produce partnership records in his possession. He was not per-
mitted to resist production of those records by claiming his personal self-incrimination
privilege.
81. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100 ("It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the
custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be."). See supra
note 41.
82. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1987). The precedential
value of Bellis was attenuated, however, for two reasons. First, the language regarding corpo-
rate custodians was only dicta because the entity in Bellis was a partnership. Bellis, 417 U.S. at
85-86. Second, since Bellis was decided prior to Fisher, the Bellis Court did not have an oppor-
tunity to consider the compelled testimony standard.
83. See supra notes 12 & 65 and accompanying text.
84. Petition for writ of certiorari filed June 26, 1987 (No. 87-3), Braswell v. United States,
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987).
85. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
86. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice Kennedy wrote the dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia joined. Id.
This alignment of the Justices is an unusual fragmentation of the liberal-conservative
blocs commonly seen in most other closely decided opinions by this Court. The dissenting
Justices may represent an alliance of interests in personal rights and corporate protection.
Schwartz, Kennedy: The Newest Justice Stakes Out His Position: The 'Gray Market' Case,
'Plain Meaning,' and Other Portents, Los Angeles Daily Journal, September 30, 1988, Daily
Journal Report, at 2.
87. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
88. Id. at 2290.
volving sole proprietors and the other concerning collective entities. 9
Relying on an agency rationale, the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the
collective entity doctrine, which withholds the privilege,90 but it recog-
nized a narrow exception for oral testimony.9 The Court also reaffirmed
the importance of effective prosecution of white-collar crime,92 but pro-
scribed the government's evidentiary use of the custodian's act of pro-
duction by attributing the custodial act of production to the corporation
itself.93
1. Two Distinct Lines of Authority
The Braswell Court stated that, according to one line of cases, the
compelled testimony standard applies to custodians of sole proprietor-
ship records. 94 "Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole proprie-
torship, [he would] be provided the opportunity to show that his act of
production would entail testimonial self-incrimination." 95
The Court explained, however, that the compelled testimony stan-
dard does not apply to custodians of collective entities.96 "[P]etitioner
has operated his business through the corporate form, and ... for pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective entities
are treated differently from individuals." 97
2. "Undergirding" Agency Rationale
Braswell argued that the collective entity doctrine was founded
upon a privacy rationale, and that fifth amendment protection was with-
held from corporate document contents because they are not private.98
Prior collective entity decisions were not concerned with the act of pro-
duction. 99 Fisher replaced this privacy rationale "with a compelled testi-
mony standard under which the contents of business documents are
never privileged but the act of producing the documents may be.'
The Court dismissed Braswell's argument and reaffirmed the viabil-
ity of the collective entity doctrine upon an agency rationale, declaring
89. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
90. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 117-136 and accompanying text.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 137-143.




98. Id. at 2290.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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that Fisher had not rendered the doctrine obsolete. 101
From Wilson forward, the Court has consistently recognized that
the custodian of corporate or entity records holds those documents
in a representative rather than a personal capacity .... [A] custo-
dian's assumption of his representative capacity leads to certain ob-
ligations, including the duty to produce corporate records on
proper demand by the Government. Under those circumstances,
the custodian's act of production is not deemed a personal act, but
rather an act of the corporation.102
The Court explained that because the act is impersonal and attribu-
table to the corporation, granting a custodian his personal privilege
would be "tantamount to [granting] a claim of privilege by the corpora-
tion . 1.. 2 03 "[I]t is well established that such artificial entities are not
protected by the Fifth Amendment.' Therefore, Braswell acting as a
corporate custodian could claim no privilege because his production was
not a personal act.105
Contrary to Braswell's assertion that Fisher had replaced the collec-
tive entity doctrine with the compelled testimony standard, the Braswell
majority found that Fisher had cited with approval the collective entity
doctrine cases which withheld the privilege from entity custodians.10 6
The Fisher Court recognized the collective entity cases as factual situa-
tions in which the act of production would not" 'involve testimonial self-
incrimination.' "07 The Braswell majority acknowledged that only Jus-
tice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fisher had recognized the agency
rationale for the collective entity doctrine cases.' 0 8 The Braswell Court
concluded, however, that whether Fisher had approved the collective en-
101. "To be sure, the holding in Fisher... embarked upon a new course of Fifth Amend-
ment analysis .... [But t]he agency rationale undergirding the collective entity decisions...
survives." Id. at 2290-91 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 2291 (citations omitted). To underscore the agency theory, the Court noted
that the privilege was withheld in prior collective entity cases even when the subpoena was
addressed to a corporate custodian personally. Id. (citing Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S.
394 (1911), and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)).
103. Id. at 2291.
104. Id. at 2287 (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88).
105. Id. at 2291. Furthermore, Randy Braswell, acting as a corporate officer, could not
rely upon the holding in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). There, the claimant of the
privilege was a sole proprietor and he held the business records in a personal rather than a
representative capacity. Id. at 2292 n.5.
106. Id. at 2292.
107. Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
108. Id. at 2292. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Fisher, joined with the
Braswell majority. Id. at 2286. On the other hand, Justice Brennan, who joined with the
Braswell dissent, was the only one in Fisher who relied upon an agency theory. Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. at 429-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Nothing in the language of the [collective entity] cases ... indicates that the act of
production ... is insufficiently testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment....
[T]hose issues . . . were disposed of on the ground ... that one in control of the
tity cases upon an agency theory or because representative acts are not
testimonial, the result was the same: "A custodian may not resist a sub-
poena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds."1 °9
3. Oral Testimony Exception
Braswell contended that Curcio v. United States 1" had drawn a dis-
tinction between a custodian's personal privilege with respect to corpo-
rate record contents, which is not recognized, and his privilege with
respect to testimony about those records, which must be recognized. 1 '
From this assertion, Braswell argued that a testimonial act may not be
compelled if it presents a risk of incriminating the custodian.' 12
The Braswell majority rejected this argument, finding instead that
the distinction drawn in Curcio was between compelled production of
records and compelled oral testimony." 3 A custodian, "'by assuming
the duties of his office, undertakes the obligation to produce the books of
which he is custodian .... But he cannot lawfully be compelled ... to
condemn himself by his own oral testimony.'""" The Braswell Court
noted that Curcio had recognized the testimonial nature of acts of pro-
duction, 115 and had held that these acts may be compelled but oral testi-
mony cannot.1 16 The act of production which Braswell wished to resist
could not be excused under the Curcio oral testimony exception.
4. Law Enforcement Concerns
The Court observed further that recognizing a corporate custodial
privilege would hamper the Government's efforts to prosecute white-
collar crime, "one of the most serious problems confronting law enforce-
records of an artificial organization undertakes an obligation with respect to those
records foreclosing any exercise of his privilege.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292.
110. 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 22.
112. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2293 (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123-24) (emphasis added by the Court).
"There is no hint in [the collective entity] decisions that a custodian of corporate or
association books waives his constitutional privilege as to oral testimony by assuming
the duties of his office.... [H]e 'has voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his
claim of privilege' only with respect to the production of the records themselves.
[Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).]" (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2293 n.6 (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 124-25).
115. Id. at 2293 ("'The custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a
subpoena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those de-
manded by the subpoena.'" (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125)).
116. Id. at 2293-94 (The petitioner in Curcio "'might have been proceeded against for his
failure to produce the records demanded by the subpoena duces tecum' " (quoting Curcio, 354
U.S. at 127 n.7) (footnote omitted)).
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ment authorities.' 17 " '[Most] evidence of wrongdoing by an organiza-
tion or its representatives is usually found in [its records and
documents].'"118 If custodians were permitted to claim their personal
privilege, "'effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would
be impossible,' "19 and prosecution of both the custodians and the orga-
nizations would be frustrated. 120 Because " 'an artificial entity can only
act ... through its ... agents, recognition of the individual's claim of
privilege... would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that
the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege .... ' "121
Braswell proposed two alternatives. 122 The Government may either
(1) address the subpoena to the corporation, allowing it to choose the
individual to produce the desired records, or (2) grant the custodian stat-
utory use immunity'23 with respect to the evidence derived from his act
of producing the documents. The Court found neither alternative
satisfactory. 124
Braswell observed that several lower courts had preserved the custo-
dian's privilege by directing the corporation to choose an agent who
could produce the records without self-incrimination. 125 The Court con-
ceded that the corporation would be forced to find the means to comply
with the subpoena, and that a common means would be the appointment
of an alternate custodian. 126 "But petitioner insists he cannot be required
to aid the appointed custodian in his search for the demanded records,
for any statement to the surrogate would itself be testimonial and incrim-
inating."' 127 In situations such as this, the Court explained, the records
custodian would probably be the only individual with the knowledge nec-
essary to find and produce the demanded documents. 128 The Court
doubted that an appointed custodian, sent on an unguided search, would
be able to find the subpoenaed documents. 129
Braswell also argued that, by granting statutory use immunity, the
Government could respect the custodian's privilege yet still obtain the
117. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)).
122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 46-47; Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294-95.
123. See infra notes 130-132.
124. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294-95.
125. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 46-47.
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documents it sought. 130 Statutory use immunity would prohibit the Gov-
ernment from using any evidence derived from the immunized act of pro-
duction against the custodian.13 1  In exchange for this immunity,
Braswell would be required to produce the documents. I 32
The Court rejected this suggestion because although statutory use
immunity would permit free use of all evidence obtained from the custo-
dian against the corporation, it could seriously hamper prosecution of the
custodian. 133 First, any testimony obtained in exchange for the granted
immunity could not be used directly or derivatively against the immu-
nized party.134 Second, a custodian would need show only that he testi-
fied under a grant of immunity to shift onto the Government the burden
of proving that all evidence it wished to use was derived from legitimate
independent sources. 135 Even if the immunized testimony were not used
for any purpose, "the Government's inability to meet the 'heavy burden'
it bears may result in the preclusion of crucial evidence that was obtained
legitimately."' 136 As a consequence, the custodian who was granted use
immunity would have a good chance of avoiding criminal prosecution.
5. Attributed Act
The Court reaffirmed the collective entity doctrine on the basis of an
agency rationale: a custodian's act of production is attributed to the cor-
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 to 6003 (1985). Congress provided statutory use immunity as a
means to satisfy law enforcement needs when those needs infringed impermissibly upon an
individual's self-incrimination privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 n.13
(1972). For a more extensive discussion of statutory use immunity, see Lushing, Testimonial
Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Study in Isomorphism, 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1690 (1982).
131. Use immunity does not bar the Government from prosecuting the witness.
Originally, immunity was construed by the Supreme Court as protecting the witness
from prosecution for any matter about which he testified ("prosecutorial" or "trans-
actional" immunity). In 1972, however, the Supreme Court ruled that it sufficed to
give the witness immunity only from having his testimony used against him. An
immunized witness could be prosecuted for matters about which he testified, but his
testimony could not be admitted into evidence at his trial or otherwise used. This
protection is called "testimonial" or "use and derivative use" immunity.
Lushing, supra note 130, at 1690 (footnotes omitted). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 449-59 (1972) (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)).
132. After immunity is granted, a witness must testify truthfully.
An immunity order requires that the witness testify despite his privilege against
self-incrimination. The order prohibits use of the testimony and use of information
derived from the testimony against the witness in criminal cases, except in perjury
prosecutions. If the witness refuses to obey the order to testify, he faces contempt
proceedings; if he testifies falsely, he faces a charge of perjury.
Lushing, supra note 130, at 1691-92 (footnotes omitted).
133. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
134. Id. (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441; 18 U.S.C. § 6002).
135. Id. (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62).
136. Id.
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poration as its own act, 137 and is not considered a personal act of the
custodian. The Court explained that as a consequence of this attribution,
the Government cannot make any evidentiary use of the individual's act
against the individual.1 38 This limitation is not constructive use immu-
nity139 but is a natural consequence of the agency rationale underlying
the collective entity doctrine. 4° The Court explained that a jury could
infer from the "corporate act" that the records at issue were authentic
and accurate. 141 "And if the defendant held a prominent position within
the corporation that produced the records, the jury may, just as it would
had someone else produced the documents, reasonably infer that he had
possession of the documents or knowledge of their contents."'142
Finally, in a footnote at the end of the opinion, the Court left "open
the question whether the agency rationale supports compelling a custo-
dian to produce corporate records when the custodian is able to establish,
by showing for example that he is the sole employee and officer of the
corporation, that the jury would inevitably conclude that he produced
the records."14 3
C. Dissenting Opinion
"The question before us," wrote Justice Kennedy, "is not the exist-
ence of the collective entity rule, but whether it contains any principle
which overrides the personal Fifth Amendment privilege of someone
compelled to give incriminating testimony.'" "The question presented
... is whether an individual may be compelled, simply by virtue of his
status as a corporate custodian, to perform a testimonial act which will
incriminate him personally."'' 45
1. Misapplication of the Collective Entity Doctrine
The dissent found no support in the collective entity doctrine for
withholding the privilege from Braswell. The dissent agreed that the col-
lective entity doctrine remains valid, but argued that it stands only for
the proposition that there is neither a self-incrimination privilege avail-
able to corporations and other collective entities, nor any privilege for
custodians with respect to the contents of entity documents.
46
137. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
138. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
139. Id. at 2295 n.ll.
140. See infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
141. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2295 n.ll.
144. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2297.
146. Id. at 2297-98.
From their reading of the collective entity cases, the dissent found
that the collective entity doctrine addressed the claim of privilege only
where applied to the contents of documents. By contrast, Randy Bras-
well asserted that his act of production would be incriminating.147 "The
distinction is central.. . . '[T]he custodian has no privilege to refuse pro-
duction although [the documents'] contents tend to criminate him.' "148
Fisher held that although no privilege may be claimed with respect to the
contents of voluntarily prepared business records, "[t]he act of producing
documents stands on an altogether different footing." '149
The dissent noted that the analysis in Fisher made it clear that avail-
ability of the self-incrimination privilege depends upon the presence of
compulsion. 5 0 Although no compulsion is involved with the contents of
voluntarily prepared documents, production of those documents is com-
pelled and is "inescapably" the custodian's own act. 5 ' Here, as in
Fisher, a subpoena commands production of documents. Compulsion is
"clearly present."' 2
2. Oral Testimony Standard
The dissent argued that "[p]roduction [of subpoenaed documents]
... in some cases, will require the custodian's own testimonial asser-
tions. . . . [T]he potential for self-incrimination inheres in the act de-
manded of the individual, [and therefore] the nature of the entity is
irrelevant to determining whether there is ground for the privilege."' 53
To determine if the act of production demanded of Braswell is testimo-
nial, it "must be analyzed under the same principles applicable to other
'forms of compelled testimony."' 154
The dissent found these principles applied in Curcio,"' in which the
Government had attempted to compel a labor union custodian to dis-
close the location of subpoenaed documents. 156 "[T]he Government ar-
gued in Curcio that the custodian could not claim a personal privilege
because he was performing only a 'representative duty' on behalf of the
collective entity .... We rejected that argument."' 157
The dissent continued:
147. Id. at 2298.
148. Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911)).
149. Id.
150. Id. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
151. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298.
152. Id. at 2287 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)); Id. at 2296
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2299.
155. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
156. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
157. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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We confront the same Fifth Amendment claim here. The ma-
jority is able to distinguish Curcio [from Braswell by] reading
Curcio to stand for the proposition that the Constitution treats oral
testimony differently that it does other forms of assertion. There is
no basis in ... the Fifth Amendment for such a distinction. The
self-incrimination clause . . . appl[ies] to testimony in all its
forms....
The distinction established by Curcio is not, of course, be-
tween oral and other forms of testimony; rather it is between a
subpoena which compels a person to "disclose the contents of his
own mind," through words or actions, and one which does not.
1 58
The dissent concluded that a custodian who is incriminated only by
contents of documents he is forced to produce has not been compelled to
"disclose the contents of his own mind." Nevertheless, "[a] custodian
who is incriminated by the personal knowledge he communicates in lo-
cating and selecting the document demanded ... has been compelled to
testify in the most elemental, constitutional sense."' 5 9 According to the
dissent, in cases similar to Braswell, where the act of production discloses
incriminating personal knowledge, production may not be compelled
without violating the custodian's fifth amendment privilege.1
60
3. Law Enforcement Concerns
The dissent found no authority in the Fifth Amendment for disre-
garding an individual's self-incrimination privilege for the benefit of law
enforcement, and argued that even if such exceptions were proper, "the
dangers prophesied by the majority are overstated."' 6' First, the dissent
observed, the number of cases in which the custodial privilege will arise
is small. Second, to the extent the privilege is available, statutory use
immunity may be granted.
The dissent noted that the right to claim the custodial privilege will
be absent in many cases because the act of production will have insuffi-
cient testimonial value. 162 The act of production required in Fisher, for
example, did not involve testimonial self-incrimination because the exist-
ence and location of the documents were known to the Government and
were "a foregone conclusion." The act of production is not subject to the
privilege when it adds little to the Government's information. 63 In




161. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411).
163. Id. The compelled act of production had no testimonial significance because the exist-
ence of the subpoenaed records was a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. In other
words, the testimonial value was minimal because the information to be learned from the act
was already known or obtainable from another source.
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subpoenaed documents would furnish incriminating testimony.
"Whether a particular act is testimonial and self-incriminating is largely
a factual issue to be decided in each case.... The existence of a privilege
... is not an automatic result.'
In addition, the dissent contended that "to the extent testimonial
assertions are being compelled, use immunity can be granted without im-
peding the investigation." 6 ' The scope of the immunity could be limited
to one custodian. The immunity would apply only to evidence derived
from the act of production as used against the custodian. The contents of
the records could be used against everyone, and evidence derived from
the act of production itself could be used against everyone except the
immunized custodian.166 "In appropriate cases the Government will be
able to establish authenticity, possession, and control by means other
than compelling assertions about them from a suspect." '167
4. Attributed Act
The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of the agency ration-
ale, arguing that "the Government does not see Braswell as a mere agent
at all ... .,"68 The Government explained that it would choose a specific
target for its subpoena whenever it wanted to make that individual com-
ply with the terms of the subpoena.169 "This is not the language of
agency. By issuing a subpoena [to a specific individual], [the Govern-
ment] has forfeited any claim that it is simply making a demand on a
corporation ....
The dissent also found the majority's attributed act theory17 1 was
undercut by the Court's reasoning in Curcio.1 72 In Curcio the Govern-
ment argued unsuccessfully that because the custodian was acting in a
representative capacity, incriminating testimony could be lawfully-com-
pelled. The dissent considered the Government's reasoning equivalent to
the Braswell majority's attributive act theory. The Curcio Court had re-
jected the Government's argument, finding that testimony could not be
alienated from the person who speaks it and attributed to the union.
Here, as in Curcio, Braswell's act of production required disclosure of
personal knowledge "which cannot be dismissed by labeling him a mere
164. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Doe v. United States, 108
S. Ct. 2341, 2350 (1988)).
165. Id.
166. Id. See supra notes 130-132.
167. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2300.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142.
172. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Summer 19891
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
agent." 173 Because Braswell's act of production could not be "alienated"
from the person who performed it, the act was entitled to the same privi-
lege accorded Curcio's oral testimony.
Furthermore, argued the dissent, the majority undermined its own
analysis by prohibiting the Government from making any evidentiary use
of the individual's act of production against the individual.174 To recog-
nize this limited protection is to admit that "the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects [a custodian] without regard to his status as a corporate employee
. . "175 The dissent found no authority cited for this limited
protection. 176
The dissent characterized this limited evidentiary use protection as
equivalent to the constructive use immunity that the Court had declined
to adopt in Doe.177 In Doe the Court held that immunity may be granted
only in compliance with statutory requirements.1 78 The Braswell dissent
disapproved of judicially creating rules of evidence to avoid constitution-
ally intolerable results, concluding instead that precedent required the
Government to grant statutory use immunity, the only sanctioned means
to compel privileged testimony. 179
5. Agency and Implied Waiver
The dissent claimed that the majority's agency rationale suggested
Braswell had waived his fifth amendment privilege. 8° The dissent ac-
knowledged that Braswell was not a "sympathetic" case because he was
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Justice Kennedy argued that the Court
impinges upon its own analysis by concluding that, while the Government may com-
pel a named individual to produce records, in any later proceeding against the person
it cannot divulge that he performed the act. But if that is so, it is because the Fifth
Amendment protects the person without regard to his status as a corporate em-
ployee; and once this be admitted, the necessary support for the majority's case has
collapsed.
Id.
176. The dissent concluded the Fifth Amendment could not provide authority for the evi-
dentiary use limitation because the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause "does not permit
balancing the convenience of the Government against the rights of a witness, and the majority
has in any case determined that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable.... [Tihere are no
grounds of which I am aware for declaring the information inadmissible, unless it be the Fifth
Amendment." Id.
177. Id. at 2300-01; see United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984) ("We decline to
extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence
of the formal request that the statute requires.").
178. Doe, 465 U.S. at 616 (The decision to grant immunity involves careful balancing of the
Government's need for information against the difficulty in prosecuting specific individuals.
The decision to grant immunity has been reserved to the Justice Department through the use
of statutory use immunity.).
179. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
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the sole shareholder of the corporation and operated it himself. Braswell
chose the corporate form for his business, and "[p]erhaps that is why the
Court suggests he waived his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights
"181
The dissent was troubled by this implied waiver theory.
[Not every employee has] the choice of his or her employer, much
less the choice of the business enterprise through which the em-
ployer conducts its business .... [N]othing in Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence indicates that the acceptance of employment should
be deemed a waiver of a specific protection that is as basic a part of
our constitutional heritage as is the privilege against self-
incrimination. 182
IM. Case Analysis
A. Attributed Act and Its Evidentiary Limitation
The traditional agency theory underlying the collective entity doc-
trine was one of waiver. That is, an individual, by voluntarily assuming
the duties of custodian, assumes a duty to fulfill all of the obligations of
the artificial entity, thereby waiving his personal privilege to refuse pro-
duction of incriminating documents.18 3 The Braswell Court introduced a
new wrinkle to this agency rationale through the attributed act theory.
Because acts of production by a corporate custodian are not personal
acts, the Court explained, evidence of his individual act of production
may not be used against him.'84 It is as if someone else produced the
documents. 185
The majority explained that this evidentiary use limitation was sim-
ply a consequence of the agency rationale undergirding the collective en-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
184. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
185. Id. ("[Tihe jury may, just as it would had someone else produced the documents,
reasonably infer that he had possession of the documents ...." (emphasis added)).
This attribution raises the question whether this theory also applies to custodians of sole
proprietorships. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv.
143, 179 (1988) [hereinafter Leading Cases] ("No stranger metaphysical maneuver is involved
in attributing this act of production to [an individual] than was involved in attributing Bras-
well's act of production to the corporation."). It is unlikely the Court would extend the theory
this far, preferring instead to treat it merely as part of the collective entity doctrine and not as
an extension to the law of agency. Were the Court to recognize such an extension, an agent
could resist a subpoena for production of another individual's documents on the grounds that
the agent's attributed act would incriminate the other individual. This would reverse the well
established rule (excepting the attorney-client privilege, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at
405) that a person can be compelled to produce another person's documents they hold in a
representative capacity. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
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tity doctrine. On the other hand, Justice Kennedy claimed it was
identical to the constructive use immunity which had been rejected in
Doe.' 8 6 The Doe Court explained: "Under [constructive use immunity],
the courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to use the
incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person claim-
ing the privilege even though the statutory procedures have not been
followed." '187
If there is any distinction between the Court's evidentiary use limita-
tion and constructive use immunity, it would be only with respect to
derivative use. Under constructive use immunity, the Government can-
not use any evidence obtained either directly or derivatively from the
immunized act.188 Under the Braswell Court's evidentiary use limitation,
the Government "may make no evidentiary use of the 'individual act'
against the individual." ' 9 The language certainly suggests that direct
and derivative use is prohibited. If so, what distinction can be made be-
tween the Braswell evidentiary use limitation and constructive use immu-
nity? It appears, as the dissent suggested, that the Court has indulged in
a bit of judicial rule making to avoid an "intolerable" constitutional
result. 190
The majority recognized that the attributed act fiction was not suffi-
cient to "immunize" all corporate custodians. In cases where a jury will
"inevitably conclude that [the custodian] produced the records[,]" it re-
mains an "open question whether the agency rationale supports compel-
ling [the] custodian to produce corporate records .... "'9'
The Court suggested that a custodian who "is the sole employee and
officer of the corporation" might qualify for this exception.' 92 The dis-
trict court concluded that Braswell operated his incorporated business in
a manner as close to a sole proprietorship as could be imagined.193 Bras-
well alone held authority to represent the business, and he alone pos-
sessed knowledge sufficient to produce the corporate records sought by
the Government.' 94 If this case went to trial, a jury very likely would
"inevitably" conclude that Braswell personally produced the subpoenaed
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
187. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984).
188. Under statutory use immunity, the Government cannot make direct or derivative use
of the immunized act. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985). The Doe Court recognized no difference in
effect between statutory and constructive use immunity; therefore both direct and derivative
use restrictions should also apply to constructive use immunity.
189. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
190. Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2295 n.ll.
192. Id.
193. See supra note 73.
194. See supra notes 72-73; Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The
Government admitted it wanted to compel Randy Braswell personally to produce the corpo-
rate records (citing the Transcript of Oral Argument at 43)).
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records. 95 Why was Braswell not given the opportunity to make this
showing? The Court provided no answer.
The Court may have believed a jury would not inevitably conclude
Braswell produced the records because he was not the only corporate
employee. 196 Given the facts of Braswell's total control of corporate af-
fairs, however, such a conclusion flies in the face of reality. Further-
more, if anyone other than Braswell could have produced the
subpoenaed records, this would undermine the Court's argument against
use of a subpoena addressed to the corporation, thereby allowing the cor-
poration to select the individual to produce the records.' 9 7
B. Oral Testimony Exception
The Court's use of the attributed act theory raises a nagging incon-
sistency. As noted by the majority, Curcio v. United States 9 recognized
that a custodian may be compelled to produce subpoenaed documents,
but cannot be compelled to give oral testimony about those documents
unless granted immunity.1 99 Under the attributed act theory, this dis-
tinction no longer makes sense. If an individual's act of production may
be attributed to the corporation, then an individual's oral testimony
might be as well. 2"
In light of the attributed act theory, there is no longer a need to
recognize a special exception for oral testimony. Oral testimony by a
collective entity agent may be deemed an act of the entity rather than an
act of the agent. Such testimony can be compelled, even if it threatens
the agent with self-incrimination, because acts of the entity have no privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination.
195. From the record the majority recognized that Braswell as "the corporate custodian is
likely the only person with knowledge about the demanded documents" and, therefore, his
help would be required to assure production of the subpoenaed documents. Braswell, 108 S.
Ct. at 2294. A jury surely would reach the same conclusion.
196. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
198. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
199. The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of Curcio as distinguishing oral
from- other forms of testimony. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
real distinction, Justice Kennedy explained, was whether compelled testimony, oral or other-
wise, would disclose the contents of one's mind. Id. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertion,
the Curcio Court plainly distinguished the availability of the privilege for oral testimony from
the act of production. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 124 (" 'Of course all oral testimony by individuals
can properly be compelled only by exchange of immunity for waiver of privilege.'" (quoting
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1947)) (emphasis in original)). See supra notes 44-48
& 114-116 and accompanying text.
200. Leading Cases, supra note 185, at 178 n.60 ("Curcio [involved] grand jury testimony.
It would have been possible to conceal at trial the fact that the defendant was the actual source
of grand jury evidence." Hence, the agency fiction could have been preserved, "[y]et the
[Curcio] Court refused to allow the testimony to be compelled.").
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The attributed act theory, therefore, casts a veil of uncertainty over
the Curcio oral testimony exception. "If taken seriously, Braswell's 'at-
tributive' agency theory calls for a reconsideration of the previously es-
tablished limits of the collective entity doctrine." 0 1
C. Law Enforcement
The center of the struggle between the Braswell majority and dissent
was the issue of effective law enforcement.20 2 The majority saw white-
collar crime as " 'the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in
America today,' ,203 and contended that recognizing a fifth amendment
privilege for collective entity custodians would seriously hamper efforts
to prosecute white-collar crime.21 The dissent argued that the "dan-
gers" of hampering prosecution efforts are "overstated. '20 5
The principle point of dispute was the efficacy of statutory use im-
munity.2 6 As the dissent insisted, the need to grant immunity is rare
and the scope of the immunity is narrow. 2°7 Most evidence is not subject
to immunity because it is not a testimonial communication,20 8 not suffi-
ciently testimonial, 2 9 not compelled, 210 not incriminating, 21' or not sub-
ject to any individual privilege.2 12 Under the compelled testimony
201. Id. at 178.
202. For a more thorough discussion of the effects recognizing a custodian's personal privi-
lege can have upon law enforcement, see Organizational Papers, supra note 37, at 650-52.
203. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294 n.9 (quoting Conyers, Corporate and White-Collar Crime:
A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 287, 288
(1980)).
204. Id. at 2294.
205. Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. The dissent did not comment on Braswell's suggestion that the Government address
the subpoena to the corporation, allowing it to appoint a surrogate custodian. The majority
summarily dismissed the suggestion when Braswell also contended that the privilege must
cover whatever he had to communicate to assist the surrogate custodian. See supra text ac-
companying notes 126-129. The majority did not discuss the viability of this alternative when
a surrogate custodian is capable of producing the subpoenaed documents.
207. Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J. dissenting); see United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605, 617 n.17 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (The extent of immunity is only as broad as
the self-incrimination privilege) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 107
(1964)).
208. See supra note 25.
209. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 411 ("Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated
because nothing he has said or done is deemed to be sufficiently testimonial").
210. Note, supra note 22, at 1551 (Testimony in response to a subpoena is compelled. Be-
cause a subpoena duces tecum does not require a person to restate or affirm the truth of the
contents of voluntarily created documents, however, the contents of subpoenaed documents
are not compelled.). See also supra note 23.
211. See supra note 24; Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n. 13 (The person asserting the privilege must
show that the risk of incrimination is substantial and real, not trifling or imaginary) (citing
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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standard, immunity attaches only to what can be learned from the act of
production, and even then only for the individual who performed the
act.213
On the other hand, whenever immunity is granted, it can have "seri-
ous consequences" if the Government wishes to prosecute the custodian.
In such a case, the Government could be required to prove a legitimate
independent source for all evidence it proposed to use against the custo-
dian, even if it did not use any evidence acquired from the immunized
act.214 Further, prosecution can be hampered when, but for the act of
production, the existence of a document is unknown,215 or when the
Government must prove the custodian knew a document's contents to
establish requisite intent.21 6
The fundamental issue was whether the Fifth Amendment, in the
name of law enforcement, permits the Government to violate a corporate
custodian's individual self-incrimination privilege without granting im-
munity.217 The majority answered that it would, subject to the eviden-
tiary limitation inherent in the custodian's acting in a representative
rather than a personal capacity. The relevant inquiry concerns the prac-
tical distinctions between this evidentiary limitation and statutory use
immunity.
The attributed act theory and statutory use immunity share certain
common features. Both require the custodian to produce the documents.
Both permit direct and derivative evidentiary use of document contents
against everyone including the custodian. Both permit direct and deriva-
tive evidentiary use of the act of production against everyone other than
the custodian. Both prohibit direct evidentiary use of the act against the
213. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The fifth amendment privilege
does not apply to document contents, but only to the testimonial aspect of the act of produc-
tion.). See also Organizational Papers, supra note 37, at 651 (The derivative use of a docu-
ment's contents should not be barred. Contents are derived from the act of production, but
not the act of production testimony.).
214. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 ("And '[o]ne raising a claim under [the federal immunity]
statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the
government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived
from legitimate independent sources.' [Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 461-62].").
215. Mosteller, supra note 32, at 40. With respect to the authentication and possession
components of the act of production, problems are manageable. With respect to existence
(when the Government would be ignorant of the document but for the act of production), the
impact of immunity is broad and far-reaching. Id. It will, in many cases, effectively immunize
the witness against any use of its contents. Id. at 43.
216. Organizational Papers, supra note 37,- at 650 n.68.
217. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does
not authorize exceptions premised on" concern for "the Government's power to investigate
corporations... and prosecute white collar crimes ...."). See also Organizational Papers,
supra note 37, at 648 (The fifth amendment privilege is concerned with integrity of the law
enforcement process, not its success. The effect upon prosecution efficiency should not be
important.).
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custodian, yet both allow the jury to infer from other evidence that the
custodian produced the documents. Statutory use immunity prohibits
derivative evidentiary use of the act against the custodian. Apparently
the evidentiary use limitation does as well.218
The difference between the two is that only statutory immunity
places a burden of proof upon the Government to show all evidence it
proposes to use was obtained from legitimate independent sources.219 Of
course, even this difference is meaningless unless the Government takes
the case to trial and chooses to prosecute the custodian individually. In
this case, Randy Braswell was denied very little, and the Government
was given the unquantifiable benefit of not having to prove the source of
all its evidence if it proceeds to trial, and if it chooses to prosecute
Braswell.
Conclusion
The arguments proffered by the Braswell majority and dissent epito-
mize the issues which had split the lower courts. The conflict between
the collective entity doctrine and the compelled testimony standard was
ultimately a struggle between the promotion of effective law enforcement
and the preservation of individual rights. The competing rationales were
agency, attended by a waiver of individual rights, against a claim that
those rights were not waived.
If that were all, Braswell would be a simple case. Indeed, the practi-
cal effects of the Court's decision are quite humble. Had the Court de-
cided in Braswell's favor, the benefits of statutory use immunity that
Randy Braswell might have enjoyed differ very little from those he did
receive from the Court's evidentiary use limitation.
Unfortunately, Braswell is not a simple case. By introducing its at-
tributed act theory, the Court has prolonged the conflict by raising new
issues. What is the authority for the evidentiary use limitation? Does it
proscribe derivative as well as direct evidentiary use of the act of produc-
tion? Can the act of production by an agent of a sole proprietorship be
attributed to the sole proprietor? If so, this would effectively create a
heretofore unknown third party privilege. And finally, what is the signif-
icance of the possible exception mentioned in the majority's footnote? If
Braswell did not qualify for this exception, who could?
218. See supra text accompanying notes 189-190. Assuming for the purpose of argument
that the attributive act theory permits derivative use, the difference between the Court's evi-
dentiary use limitation and statutory use immunity would be any evidence that could be de-
rived from the fictional corporate act as opposed to the individual's act. The custodian's act is
deemed one of the corporation, and is not considered a personal act.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 135-136.
BRASWELL v. UNITED STATES
The compelled testimony standard in Fisher opened a door of possi-
bility for collective entity custodians. Braswell attempted to close that
door, but instead left it ajar.
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